South Sudan Slides Toward Civil War as 267,000 Flee Jonglei Offensive

South Sudan’s military launched a major offensive in Jonglei state in late January, displacing more than 267,000 civilians and triggering warnings from UN investigators that the country faces a return to full-scale civil war. The violence marks the effective collapse of the 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement that ended a five-year conflict which killed an estimated 400,000 people.

More than 267,000 people have been displaced across Jonglei, Lakes, Upper Nile and Central Equatoria states, according to verified data from the International Organization for Migration. An estimated 100,000 people fled across the border into Ethiopia following a 72-hour evacuation order issued March 6 for Akobo County, while thousands more scattered to Displacement camps with no humanitarian access.

The offensive followed opposition forces seizing government outposts in central Jonglei beginning in December, per Al Jazeera. Forces involved include units loyal to opposition leader Riek Machar and the Nuer White Army, an ethnic militia that considers itself independent despite historical alignment with Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army-in-Opposition.

Resource Competition Fuels Violence

Jonglei sits at the intersection of multiple strategic interests. Most of the state falls within oil development Block B, granted to Total S.A. before independence, making it critical terrain in a country where oil revenues constitute the government’s economic backbone. The state also spans prime agricultural land and critical water resources along the White Nile.

Oil reserves in Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity states have become strategic areas of control, with the SPLA and SPLA-in-Opposition fighting heavily over oil-producing regions, notes a 2015 SOMO country profile. Current violence follows historical patterns: the economic and strategic importance of oil-producing areas has been a major driver for violence, with fighting spreading almost immediately to oil-rich regions following initial clashes in past conflicts.

But resources extend beyond petroleum. Resource-based conflicts in South Sudan involve not only oil, but also management, allocation and control over land and water resources, with access to land and water for livelihoods figuring prominently as sources of tension, according to research published by the Centro de Estudos Internacionais.

Peace Agreement Unravels

The 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict established a power-sharing arrangement between President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar. The agreement mandated ceasefire, unification of rival armed factions, and a transitional pathway toward constitutional reform and elections, but implementation has stalled with military integration incomplete and accountability mechanisms not operationalized, per a March report from JURIST.

Escalating clashes between government and opposition forces in at least six of the country’s 10 states pose a serious threat of irretrievable breakdown of the permanent ceasefire, warned the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission in a January briefing obtained by Radio Tamazuj. The monitoring body cited government proposals to amend the agreement to “de-link” December 2026 elections from completion of a permanent constitution and national census.

Civilians endure severe abuses including killings and systematic sexual violence, arbitrary detention, forced displacement and deprivation amid the deteriorating situation, the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan found in a February 27 report to the Human Rights Council.

Ethnic Weaponization

The violence carries distinct ethnic dimensions. Machar, an ethnic Nuer, was made the most senior of five vice presidents under the 2018 agreement alongside President Salva Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, ending a civil war waged largely along ethnic lines that killed an estimated 400,000 people.

On January 25, a senior military commander was filmed issuing orders that drew international condemnation. General Johnson Olony told forces in Duk county: “Spare no lives. When we arrive there, don’t spare an elderly, don’t spare a chicken, don’t spare a house or anything”, according to video shared on social media and reported by Al Jazeera. Deploying Olony to Jonglei “is incendiary”, said Joshua Craze, an independent analyst on South Sudan.

On February 21, government forces killed 21 civilians in Pankor village in eastern Jonglei, luring them into gathering at one place with promises of food aid then opening fire, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk alleged in a March 10 statement, noting some acts may amount to war crimes.

Regional Cascade Effects

The Jonglei offensive compounds an already severe humanitarian emergency across East Africa. By September 2025, Eastern and Southern Africa hosted 25.1 million forcibly displaced people, including 6.3 million refugees and 18.1 million internally displaced persons, driven by protracted conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique, according to UNHCR.

South Sudan itself already hosts nearly 600,000 refugees, mostly from Sudan, and over 800,000 South Sudanese returnees who fled the conflict in Sudan since April 2023. The country now generates outflows while absorbing inflows, creating bidirectional displacement pressure.

South Sudan has faced a fiscal crisis since 2024 when fighting in neighboring Sudan burst a critical pipeline used to export oil and cut nearly two-thirds of the state’s revenue, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. This revenue collapse weakens the government’s capacity to provide services or buy loyalty, increasing reliance on coercive control.

Humanitarian access has collapsed in conflict zones. Akobo County remains completely inaccessible to humanitarians following the March 6 evacuation order, while access to Lankien, Waat, Walgak, Boung, Wecjal and Kaikuiny remains restricted due to sporadic clashes. Médecins Sans Frontières evacuated its team from Akobo, leaving thousands without access to primary health care and halting preparations for malaria season and routine vaccination.

Multipolar Neglect

The South Sudan crisis unfolds amid Western diplomatic bandwidth consumed by other theaters. While the UN Security Council maintains an arms embargo on South Sudan and peacekeepers remain deployed through UNMISS, high-level diplomatic engagement has been episodic.

The 2018 Revitalized Agreement is at serious risk of collapse, with escalating military offensives, political crackdowns and foreign military presence accelerating the breakdown and fueling deep fear, instability and widespread trauma, the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan warned in a June 2025 statement.

The 2018 agreement is at serious risk of collapse unless regional powers urgently step in to halt escalating violence and political repression, with a state of emergency in effect in multiple regions and reports of Ugandan forces supporting government operations, the Commission reiterated in a January 2026 warning carried by Anadolu Agency.

The violence exposes a broader pattern: African conflicts receive systematically less international attention and resources than crises elsewhere. In 2022, all 10 of the world’s most overlooked humanitarian crises were in Africa, with over 2 million online articles written about the Ukraine war—more than for 41 other crises combined and over three times more articles about Will Smith slapping Chris Rock than these 10 African crises combined, CARE International found.

What to Watch

Election timeline: South Sudan’s first post-independence elections are scheduled for December 2026, but the transitional period has been extended multiple times due to lack of necessary reforms and infrastructure. Government proposals to de-link elections from constitutional and census completion suggest further delays, which could trigger renewed political contestation.

Ethnic mobilization indicators: Inflammatory rhetoric by senior military figures and troop mobilization in Jonglei significantly increase the risk of mass violence against civilians, with commanders instructing troops to “spare no lives”. Monitor whether command discipline reasserts or ethnic targeting escalates.

Oil infrastructure vulnerability: Jonglei’s Block B remains underdeveloped due to insecurity, but any moves by armed groups to target or control oil installations could reshape government calculus. Production has been affected by ageing fields, damage to infrastructure during conflict and regional instability, limiting state revenue options.

Regional spillover mechanics: The intersection of South Sudan’s violence with ongoing conflict in Sudan creates potential for armed group coordination across borders, weapons flows, and cascading displacement that overwhelms host communities in Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya. South Sudan risks being drawn into wider geopolitical tensions linked to external support for Sudan’s warring factions, particularly around UAE involvement.

UN Security Council positioning: The arms embargo remains in place but enforcement is weak. Watch whether the US, UK or European members push for targeted sanctions on commanders implicated in atrocity rhetoric, or whether geopolitical fragmentation limits consensus. IGAD and African Union engagement will determine whether regional mediation gains traction or South Sudan slides toward full conflict resumption with minimal external constraint.