Southeast Asia’s Nuclear Renaissance: AI Infrastructure and Iran Crisis Drive Energy Security Pivot
Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines are reinstating atomic power programs after decades of dormancy as AI datacenter demands collide with Strait of Hormuz supply disruptions.
Southeast Asian nations have accelerated nuclear power expansion plans in direct response to two converging forces: hyperscale AI datacenter energy requirements and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which has disrupted 20% of global oil and LNG supply since 28 February 2026.
Vietnam approved a revised Power Development Plan in April 2025 targeting 4,000–6,400 MW of nuclear capacity by 2053, according to the Stimson Center. The Ninh Thuan plants are projected for commissioning between 2030 and 2035. Thailand has committed to 600 MW of small modular reactor (SMR) capacity by 2037, with potential scaling to 3 GW by 2050. The Philippines established the Philippine Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority in September 2025 and is targeting 1,200 MW by 2032. Indonesia approved licensing for ThorCon Power’s molten salt reactor technology in March 2025, with first-unit deployment projected around 2032–2033.
These programmes represent a strategic reversal. Vietnam shelved its nuclear plans in 2016 due to cost concerns. Thailand paused development after Fukushima in 2011. The Philippines abandoned the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant following Chernobyl in 1986. The current reinstatement is explicitly framed around energy independence and AI Infrastructure rather than climate policy alone.
strait of hormuz disruption reshapes risk calculus
The 2026 Iran-Israel conflict has closed the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping since late February, halting roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day—20% of global supply—and disrupting 20% of global LNG trade, per crisis data compiled by multiple sources. Brent crude peaked at $126 per barrel on 8 March before settling near $95–100 per barrel as of late March. Qatar’s LNG export capacity has been reduced by 17% due to Iranian attacks on production facilities, resulting in an estimated $20 billion in lost annual revenue, NBC News reported.
“The Iran war is underscoring the vulnerability of Asia’s energy supplies, raising the sense of urgency about finding alternatives to oil and gas in Southeast Asia,” analysts noted in a 26 March report from Associated Press. Alvie Asuncion-Astronomo of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute stated: “The surge in crude oil prices caused by the escalating conflict has raised the motivation for countries to speed up their nuclear efforts.”
ai infrastructure demand creates baseload power imperative
Southeast Asia’s datacenter market was valued at $13.71 billion in 2024 and is projected to reach $30.47 billion by 2030, representing a 14.23% compound annual growth rate, according to the Nuclear Business Platform. Global AI datacenter power demand is forecast to reach 68 GW by 2027—nearly double 2022 capacity—and potentially 327 GW by 2030. Goldman Sachs Research projects global datacenter power demand will increase by 165% by 2030 compared to 2023 levels.
The International Energy Agency estimates 130 TWh of additional electricity supply from natural gas will be required for datacenter use through 2030, with renewables adding 110 TWh. Nuclear currently provides 15% of datacenter baseload power globally but is expected to grow post-2030 as SMR deployments accelerate. In the United States, datacenter electricity demand is forecast to grow from 176 TWh in 2023 to between 325 and 580 TWh by 2028, per Harvard’s Belfer Center.
“As AI infrastructure demand is projected to more than double to $30.47 billion by 2030, the region’s energy systems are pivoting to nuclear to provide the reliable, carbon-free baseload power that renewables alone cannot consistently deliver.”
— Asia Nuclear Business Platform, 2026 analysis
King Lee of the World Nuclear Association observed: “There is a more serious, new and growing momentum for the development of Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia.” Vietnam’s Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh described the Ninh Thuan projects as “nationally significant, strategic projects,” signalling a shift from discretionary energy policy to national security infrastructure.
regulatory and financing obstacles remain
Despite accelerated timelines, implementation faces material barriers. The Stimson Center notes that regulatory frameworks remain underdeveloped across the region. Vietnam’s November 2024 National Assembly approval of the Ninh Thuan restart was a political milestone, but procurement and vendor selection are still pending. Thailand signed a 123 agreement with the United States in 2025 to facilitate nuclear trade, but project finance structures have not been finalised.
Indonesia’s ThorCon licensing approval represents the region’s most advanced SMR deployment pathway, but the technology is pre-commercial and has no operational reference plants. The Philippines’ PhilATOM is less than a year old and lacks the institutional depth of established regulators in France or South Korea. Public opposition, while muted compared to post-Fukushima sentiment, remains a wildcard—particularly in Thailand, where anti-nuclear activism has historically been vocal.
geopolitical implications for energy majors and tech infrastructure
The nuclear pivot carries material implications for both energy incumbents and hyperscale cloud providers. TotalEnergies, Shell, and Chevron have significant LNG exposure in Southeast Asia; a structural shift toward nuclear baseload erodes long-term gas demand growth assumptions. Conversely, reactor vendors—Rosatom (Russia), Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, Westinghouse (US), and EDF (France)—are positioning for first-mover advantage in a market the World Nuclear Association estimates will account for 157 GW of newcomer nuclear capacity by mid-century.
For tech infrastructure players—Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, Alibaba Cloud—the nuclear acceleration offers a pathway to guaranteed baseload power in a region where grid constraints have delayed datacenter deployments. Microsoft has already piloted nuclear-adjacent power purchase agreements in the United States; similar structures are likely in Southeast Asia as governments prioritise AI-driven economic growth.
| Country | Target Capacity | Timeline | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vietnam | 4,000–6,400 MW | 2030–2035 commissioning | National Assembly approved April 2025 |
| Thailand | 600 MW (scaling to 3 GW) | 2037 (3 GW by 2050) | 123 agreement signed with US |
| Philippines | 1,200 MW (4,800 MW by 2050) | 2032 | PhilATOM established September 2025 |
| Indonesia | ThorCon MSR (capacity TBD) | 2032–2033 | Licensing approved March 2025 |
what to watch
Vietnam’s vendor selection for Ninh Thuan—expected in late 2026—will signal whether Russia retains its historical position or whether South Korea, France, or the United States secure a foothold. The outcome will clarify whether Southeast Asia’s nuclear expansion proceeds under Western or Russian/Chinese technical standards, with implications for grid interoperability and supply chain dependencies.
Thailand’s 2037 SMR timeline hinges on the commercial readiness of modular reactor designs from NuScale, Rolls-Royce, or X-energy. If these technologies remain pre-commercial by 2030, Thailand may pivot to conventional large-scale reactors, extending timelines by a decade. Indonesia’s ThorCon deployment—if operational by 2033—would provide the first commercial proof point for molten salt reactor economics in a developing economy.
Finally, the duration of the Strait of Hormuz closure will determine whether Southeast Asia’s nuclear pivot is a structural energy transition or a reactive policy overcorrection. If the strait reopens within six months and LNG prices normalise, political momentum for nuclear may dissipate. If the closure extends into 2027, the current policy trajectory becomes locked in, with binding procurement commitments and sunk regulatory infrastructure costs making reversal politically untenable.