AfD’s Kremlin Outreach on Nord Stream Tests Germany’s Russia Sanctions Resolve
Far-right party's direct Gazprom talks on pipeline restart exploit energy cost pressures as polling momentum reaches 27.5% nationally.
Markus Frohnmaier, foreign policy spokesman for Germany’s AfD, met Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum on 3 June to discuss recommissioning the sabotaged Nord Stream pipelines—a move that would require unwinding EU energy sanctions and resolving the still-open investigation into who destroyed Europe’s largest gas conduit in September 2022.
The meeting signals a calculated probe of Western cohesion on Russia policy at a moment when the AfD commands unprecedented leverage. The party now polls at 27.5% nationally according to PolitPro as of 3 June, with a record 41% in Saxony-Anhalt state polling on 2 June according to European Conservative—the first time the far-right has crossed 40% in any German state. While formal coalition participation remains blocked by other parties’ firewall strategy, the AfD’s polling strength creates pressure on energy policy that rivals its excluded status in government.
The St Petersburg Play
Four AfD lawmakers—Frohnmaier, Jörg Urban, Steffen Kotré, and Petr Bystron—attended the St Petersburg forum despite explicit guidance from Germany’s Foreign Office advising against the trip, according to Yahoo News. The federal government stated it did not support the delegation’s travel. Frohnmaier’s session with Miller focused on what he termed joint exploration of “opportunities” for Nord Stream restoration “after the end of the conflict in Ukraine,” per TASS.
“There is great interest on our part in putting the Nord Stream pipeline back into operation, and now we should jointly look at what opportunities exist in order to come to an understanding on this issue again in the future, after the end of the conflict in Ukraine.”
— Markus Frohnmaier, AfD deputy head of faction in Bundestag
The timing exploits a genuine vulnerability. Germany’s gas storage levels are the lowest in five years, according to Eastern Herald citing Gazprom statements. While German households have absorbed liquefied natural gas imports at higher cost since the September 2022 pipeline sabotage, sustained elevated energy prices create political space for the AfD’s narrative that sanctions harm Germany more than Russia. Frohnmaier claimed approximately 1,500 German companies continue operating in Russia, framing sanctions as asymmetrically enforced.
Legal and Strategic Barriers
Nord Stream restoration faces multiple structural obstacles beyond political will. The EU adopted its 20th sanctions package against Russia on 23 April, adding 120 individual listings—the largest such package in two years. More critically, the EU Commission banned direct and indirect use of Nord Stream pipelines in July 2025, creating a legal barrier that would require consensus unwinding across 27 member states.
The sabotage investigation remains unresolved at the international level, though German authorities concluded in 2024-25 that Ukrainian operatives directed the attack. Reopening the pipelines would require not only physical repairs—estimated in the hundreds of millions of euros—but resolution of liability questions, insurance certification, and operator certification from German and EU regulators. Analysis from the Atlantic Council in mid-2025 highlighted that even technical restoration would face deauthorization risks under current sanctions architecture.
Polling Momentum as Policy Leverage
The AfD’s strategy banks on translating electoral strength into policy pressure without entering government. At 27.5% nationally, the party now runs effectively even with the CDU according to Statista polling from May, which showed 27% AfD versus 25% CDU. The 2.5 percentage point increase over two weeks suggests accelerating momentum coinciding with the St Petersburg visit—whether causative or correlative remains unclear, but the sequencing hands the AfD a narrative of diplomatic initiative.
The firewall strategy—whereby CDU, SPD, Greens, and FDP refuse coalition with the AfD regardless of vote share—holds at the federal level but faces strain in eastern states where the AfD’s 41% Saxony-Anhalt performance makes minority governments or tolerance arrangements increasingly plausible. The party’s explicit framing of Nord Stream as a matter of “German national interests” positions sanctions as externally imposed constraints rather than sovereign choices.
Frohnmaier’s statement that “our task is to place German national interests at the centre without compromise” encapsulates the AfD’s reframing of energy dependence on Russia as pragmatic self-interest rather than strategic vulnerability. The party has seized on public anger over how the pipeline destruction locked in higher energy costs, now campaigning to reduce aid to Kyiv while advocating direct engagement with Moscow on infrastructure restoration.
What to Watch
Track whether the AfD’s Kremlin engagement produces any formal policy response from Berlin—silence would signal confidence in sanctions durability, while public rebuttal could amplify the AfD’s framing. Monitor whether other EU member states with Russia-skeptical positions (Poland, Baltics) explicitly criticise the St Petersburg visit, which would test intra-EU cohesion on far-right engagement with Moscow. German gas storage trajectories through winter 2026-27 will determine whether energy cost pressures intensify or ease, directly affecting the AfD’s political leverage. Finally, watch for any movement in the sabotage investigation—formal attribution to Ukrainian actors would complicate NATO cohesion and potentially validate AfD arguments about sanctions asymmetry, while continued ambiguity preserves the status quo that favours maintaining the current energy architecture.