American Sympathy Shifts to Palestinians for First Time in Polling History
Gallup and university polls show unprecedented reversal driven by young voters and Democrats, marking a generational rupture in U.S. Middle East policy consensus.
For the first time since systematic polling began, more Americans now express greater sympathy for Palestinians than Israelis in the Middle East conflict, according to multiple surveys conducted in 2025. The shift represents a historic break from seven decades of pro-Israel majorities and signals a fundamental realignment in how the American public views the region’s most enduring dispute.
An August 2025 poll from the University of Maryland found 28% of Americans sympathize with Palestinians compared to 22% with Israelis, while Gallup’s March 2025 survey recorded 33% Palestinian sympathy versus 46% Israeli sympathy—the narrowest gap in 25 years of tracking. A New York Times/Siena poll from October 2025 showed 35% backing Palestinians and 34% Israel, the first time Palestinians led since the survey began in 1998.
The Generational Divide
The transformation is starkest among Americans under 35. Among 18-29 year olds, 61% backed Palestinians over Israel, according to the Times poll. Democrats now sympathize with Palestinians over Israelis by nearly 3-to-1 (59% vs. 21%), while Republicans broadly sympathize with Israelis (75%) over Palestinians (10%).
The partisan chasm now exceeds anything recorded in polling history. In 2001, over 50% of Democrats sympathized with Israelis versus 16% with Palestinians; by 2025, 59% of Democrats sympathize with Palestinians versus just 21% with Israelis. Republican views remained stable, with sympathy for Israelis dropping only slightly from 78% to 75%.
Among Republicans aged 18-34, only 24% sympathize more with Israelis, compared to 52% of Republicans 35 and older—a 28-point generation gap within the party that typically shows the strongest Israel support.
Gaza’s Death Toll and Changing Perceptions
The acceleration coincides with Israel’s military campaign in Gaza following Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack that killed approximately 1,200 Israelis. A Max Planck Institute study estimated 78,318 Palestinians were killed in Gaza between October 7, 2023 and the end of 2024, while Gaza authorities reported more than 45,000 deaths by December 2024.
Approval for Israel’s Gaza actions dropped from 50% at the war’s start to 32% by 2025, with 60% now disapproving, according to Gallup. The decline was driven by 16-point drops among both Democrats (to 8% approval) and independents (to 25%).
“What we’re seeing here is an entrenchment of a generational paradigm among particularly young Americans who now perceive the horror in Gaza in a way of describing the character of Israel itself.”
— Shibley Telhami, University of Maryland Professor
A plurality of Americans (45%) now believe Israel is committing genocide against Palestinians, with only 31% disagreeing, according to survey data compiled by Brookings Institution researchers. Among Democrats, 67% define Israel’s actions as genocide or akin to genocide.
Policy Implications and Congressional Disconnect
Despite shifting public sentiment, U.S. policy remains largely unchanged. Since October 7, 2023, the United States has enacted legislation providing at least $16.3 billion in direct military aid to Israel, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. The Israeli Defense Ministry reported that by May 2025, the United States had delivered 90,000 tons of arms on 800 transport planes and 140 ships.
American sympathy for Israel has dominated polling since systematic tracking began. In March 1948, before Israel’s founding, 28% of Americans sympathized with Jewish people in Palestine versus 11% with Arabs. Since 1967, Israel has averaged 49% support compared to 13% for Arab states/Palestinians.
In July 2025, Congress voted 422-to-six against blocking $500 million in missile defense support for Israel, underscoring the gap between Public Opinion and legislative action. Analysts attribute the disconnect to structural factors: foreign policy traditionally does not drive elections, with domestic issues like abortion, the economy and gun control dominating the electoral agenda for Democrats.
Pew Research data shows negative attitudes toward Israel rose from 42% to 53% of all U.S. adults between 2022 and March 2025, and from 53% to 69% among Democrats. Among Democrats 50 and older, negative attitudes increased from 43% to 66%—evidence the shift extends beyond youth activism.
The Pro-Israel Lobby Responds
Pro-Israel organizations have intensified efforts to counter the trend. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has spent millions to defeat critics of the Israeli government, particularly progressives in Democratic primaries, according to reporting by Al Jazeera.
| Measure | Republicans | Democrats |
|---|---|---|
| Sympathize with Israelis | 75% | 21% |
| Sympathize with Palestinians | 10% | 59% |
| View Israel favorably | 83% | 33% |
| View Palestinian Territories favorably | 18% | 45% |
As older voters—Israel’s last electoral stronghold—make way for younger voters more sympathetic to Palestinian rights, the political math will shift toward profound political change, though the question is when, not if, writes analyst Marwan Bishara.
What to Watch
The immediate policy impact may be limited by institutional inertia and AIPAC’s continued influence, but three indicators merit attention. First, whether young Republicans, whom party leadership consider integral for electoral success in 2024 and beyond, continue distancing themselves from unconditional Israel support. Second, if Democratic primary challengers successfully use Palestinian rights as a wedge issue against pro-Israel incumbents. Third, how the 2026 congressional elections reflect—or ignore—the 28-point gap between public sentiment (58% oppose taking sides) and legislative voting patterns.
Longer-term, Demographics favor continued erosion of the pro-Israel consensus. Negative views of Israel among Democrats aged 18-49 reached 71%, up from 62%, while young Republicans aged 18-49 shifted from 35% unfavorable to 50%. The generational replacement cycle suggests these trends will intensify rather than reverse, potentially forcing a fundamental reassessment of U.S. Middle East policy within the next decade.