Energy Geopolitics · · 7 min read

Gulf States Push Trump Toward Total Iranian Defeat as War Enters Second Month

Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Kuwait privately urge administration to reject negotiated settlement, leveraging their vulnerability to shape U.S. endgame strategy.

Gulf state leaders are privately pressuring the Trump administration to continue military operations against Iran until the regime is decisively defeated, rejecting a negotiated settlement one month into a conflict that has killed more than 3,000 people and sent oil prices to their highest level since 2022.

Officials from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain have conveyed in private conversations they do not want military operations to end until significant leadership changes or a dramatic shift in Iranian behavior occurs, according to Associated Press reporting on March 30. The UAE has emerged as the most hawkish, pushing hard for a ground invasion after absorbing more than 2,300 missile and drone attacks since the war began February 28.

War Timeline

The conflict began February 28 with U.S.-Israeli strikes that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Within four weeks, the Strait of Hormuz experienced a 97% drop in commercial traffic, Brent crude rose 55% to $112.78 per barrel, and Iranian retaliation targeted Gulf infrastructure across the region.

The Gulf pressure campaign reveals deepening fractures within the Trump Administration over the war’s endgame. While the White House offered a 15-point ceasefire proposal on March 25 calling for Iran to dismantle nuclear sites and suspend its ballistic missile program—which Tehran rejected—President Trump has simultaneously claimed Iran is “begging to make a deal” while threatening escalation if his terms aren’t met, per CNN reporting on March 28.

Front-Line Vulnerability Drives Gulf Strategy Shift

Gulf States initially opposed military action against Iran but now find themselves bearing the brunt of Tehran’s retaliation. The UAE alone has faced attacks at a rate of roughly 75 strikes per day since late February, according to Responsible Statecraft. This exposure has transformed their strategic calculus from risk avoidance to risk acceptance—but only if the conflict achieves decisive results.

“Ending the war with Iran still in possession of the tools it is currently using to target the GCC would be a strategic disaster.”

— Senior Gulf Official

“Our thinking does not stop at a ceasefire, but rather turns toward solutions that ensure lasting security in the Arabian Gulf, curbing the nuclear threat, missiles, drones, and the bullying of the straits,” Anwar Gargash, senior adviser to UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed, stated in recent remarks reported by the Stimson Center.

The Gulf position reflects a calculated bet: having already paid the cost of Iranian retaliation, these states now seek maximum return on that investment through regime degradation rather than accepting a negotiated outcome that leaves Tehran’s strike capabilities intact.

Oil Markets Price in Extended Conflict

Energy Markets are absorbing the implications of prolonged confrontation. Brent crude closed at $112.78 per barrel on March 31 for May delivery contracts—a 55% monthly gain representing the largest one-month increase since 1988, according to CNBC. The Strait of Hormuz, which typically handles 20% of global oil flows, remains near-total closure with commercial traffic down 97%.

Market Impact Snapshot
Brent Crude (March 31)$112.78/bbl
Monthly Gain+55%
Strait Traffic Decline-97%
Urea Fertilizer Price Increase+50%

“The oil market did not underreact to the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz; it absorbed it,” Paola Rodriguez-Masiu, chief oil analyst at Rystad Energy, told CNBC on March 27. “For nearly four weeks, markets have shown remarkable resilience… That phase is now ending.”

Beyond crude prices, the conflict has disrupted global fertilizer supply chains. Urea prices have surged 50% since late February as the Strait closure cuts off approximately one-third of world fertilizer flows, creating downstream agricultural cost pressures heading into spring planting season.

Policy Divisions Widen Inside Administration

The Gulf states’ maximalist position finds receptive ears within certain Trump administration circles, even as the White House projects diplomatic flexibility. Stephen Miller, who holds significant influence in the current administration, has ties to hardline Israeli policy advocates. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo publicly praised Trump’s Iran strikes, though he holds no formal role in the current government, per Al Jazeera analysis from late February.

This internal tension produces contradictory signals. White House spokeswoman Anna Kelly claimed on March 28 that Iran was “begging to make a deal” after U.S. forces degraded Tehran’s ballistic missile capacity and navy. Yet Tehran rejected the administration’s 15-point proposal three days earlier, and Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf warned that “Iranian forces are waiting for the arrival of American troops on the ground to set them on fire,” according to Washington Times reporting on March 29.

Regional powers attempted to bridge the diplomatic gap through a trilateral meeting in Pakistan on March 29-30, with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey discussing potential pathways to reopen the Strait. The gathering signals some Gulf states are hedging their hawkish Washington advocacy with regional mediation channels, though outcomes from the Pakistan talks remain unclear.

What to Watch

The coming two weeks will determine whether Gulf pressure successfully tilts U.S. strategy toward military maximalism or whether resource constraints and casualty aversion force a negotiated offramp. Monitor Brent crude behaviour above $110—sustained elevation indicates market confidence in extended conflict. Watch for any shift in UAE rhetoric from ground invasion advocacy to acceptance of degraded Iranian capabilities as sufficient victory condition, which would signal Gulf states recognise limits on U.S. escalation appetite. Track whether Pakistan trilateral produces concrete Strait reopening framework, as this would provide diplomatic cover for both Gulf states and Washington to declare objectives met without regime change. Finally, any significant uptick in U.S. troop deployments to forward positions in Kuwait or Qatar would confirm the hawkish faction has won the internal policy battle.