Rwanda Signals Withdrawal from Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado as EU Funding Expires
Threat to pull 4,000 troops from gas-rich insurgency zone exposes widening cracks in African security architecture and puts $50 billion in LNG projects at risk.
Rwanda has warned it will withdraw troops from Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province if sustainable international funding is not secured, jeopardizing security around $50 billion in natural gas projects and exposing deep fissures in Africa’s approach to counterterrorism. The warning followed reports that European Union support for the mission is due to expire in May with no plans for renewal, according to Reuters. Rwanda’s Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe stated Saturday that Rwanda will withdraw troops if sustainable international funding for the counter-terrorism mission is not secured soon.
Rwanda has received about 20 million euros ($23 million) in EU support, which government spokesperson Yolande Makolo said was a fraction of the cost of the mission, adding it cost the Rwandan government at least 10 times that amount. The disparity underscores a broader crisis: African-led security missions increasingly operate on political goodwill rather than predictable funding, even as traditional donors retreat from peacekeeping commitments.
Security Progress Reverses as Regional Mission Collapses
Rwanda’s deployment in 2021, at Mozambique’s request, has helped stabilize areas previously overrun by an Islamic-linked insurgency, per Reuters. On 9 July 2021, Rwanda sent 1,000 personnel (700 soldiers, 300 policemen) to assist the Mozambican government. That force has since approximately doubled to about 4,000 troops as they expanded to replace SAMIM forces following the Southern African Development Community Mission’s withdrawal in mid-2024.
The insurgency in the gas-rich Mozambican region, which erupted in 2017, brought construction of TotalEnergies’ $20 billion liquefied natural gas project to a halt. In January, the French energy company and the Mozambican government agreed to resume construction. First LNG is expected in 2029 as the project progress is currently at 40%.
But security gains remain fragile. The Islamist insurgency, though weakened, continues to simmer. The Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah (ASWJ) has displaced more than 700,000 people since the insurgency began, with more than 3,340 civilians killed and over 856,000 displaced since October 2017.
$50 Billion Energy Bet Hangs in the Balance
Cabo Delgado holds some of the world’s largest natural gas reserves. In 2010, large natural gas reserves were discovered in the offshore Rovuma Basin, 85 trillion cubic feet in the so called Area 4, and south of Palma, 5 trillion cubic feet in the so called Area 1 alone. Cabo Delgado is now home to Africa’s three largest liquid natural gas projects: the Mozambique LNG Project (Total, formerly Anadarko) worth $20bn, Coral FLNG Project (ENI and ExxonMobil) worth $4.7bn, and Rovuma LNG Project (ExxonMobil, ENI and CNPC) worth $30bn.
Patrick Pouyanné, Chairman and CEO of TotalEnergies, met in January in Afungi with President Daniel Chapo, announcing together the full restart of Mozambique LNG project activities. This followed the decision made in November 2025 to lift the Force Majeure that was declared in 2021. The Government confirmed all measures taken to address the security and the continued cooperation with Rwanda.
Construction activities have now restarted both offshore and onshore at Afungi site, with over 4,000 workers currently mobilized of which over 3,000 are Mozambican nationals. But the project’s restart assumes Rwandan forces will remain in position to secure the Afungi peninsula. Rwandan troops have played a central role in protecting the Afungi peninsula, the location of a massive liquefied natural gas project operated by TotalEnergies that was suspended following insurgent attacks in 2021.
TotalEnergies declared force majeure in April 2021 after militants attacked Palma, a town near the LNG construction site. The assault killed more than 1,190 people and forced the evacuation of all project personnel. The French company spent an additional $4.5 billion during the shutdown period, costs it is now seeking to recoup through revised budget negotiations with Mozambique’s government.
African Security Architecture Under Strain
Rwanda’s potential withdrawal exposes a systemic crisis in how Africa finances its own security. The lack of adequate resources remains a significant challenge, per Global Policy Journal. SAMIM’s withdrawal signifies a strategic reallocation of financial resources to tackle more immediate and pressing concerns at home.
SAMIM operations lasted three years. It was expected that the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces would take over the areas liberated by SAMIM forces upon its withdrawal. SAMIM’s withdrawal from Mozambique, the result of financial difficulties, comes at a time when terrorist attacks have increased in Cabo Delgado.
UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated at the February 2026 African Union Summit that Security Council Resolution 2719 is pivotal, as for the first time there is a clear mechanism for AU-led peace support operations authorized by the Security Council, funded through assessed contributions. But he expressed profound regret that the Security Council failed to achieve consensus on funding through assessed contributions for the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia.
The AUSSOM funding crisis mirrors Mozambique’s predicament. There is no funding pledged for AUSSOM for 2026 and little indication that this financial situation will improve over the next few years, according to the IPI Global Observatory. In the short term, the funding deficit is unlikely to trigger an immediate collapse of the mission.
- Rwandan withdrawal would create security vacuum around Africa’s largest LNG projects, potentially forcing second force majeure
- SAMIM’s 2024 collapse demonstrated limits of regional burden-sharing amid competing domestic crises
- UN assessed contributions mechanism (Resolution 2719) remains theoretical without Security Council consensus
- African Peace Fund mobilization push signals shift toward private sector and domestic revenue sources
- Insurgents retain capacity to exploit gaps between Rwandan, Mozambican, and Tanzanian forces
Energy Markets Reassess Africa Risk Premium
Global LNG markets had anticipated Mozambique as a critical new supplier, particularly for Asian buyers seeking alternatives to Middle Eastern sources vulnerable to geopolitical disruption. For Asian consumers, LNG from Mozambique is important given the country’s geographic position, far from chokepoints like the Straits of Hormuz. For Japan, the world’s second-largest LNG importer after China, Mitsui’s 20% offtake from TotalEnergies’ project is likely to be sold to Japanese utilities. The Japanese government has also supported the project with loans and investments. Given the 4-year delay created by force majeure, however, Japan has sought alternatives. The Nigerian National Petroleum Company shipped its first-ever LNG cargo to Japan in June 2024.
A second force majeure would accelerate buyer diversification away from African suppliers. Prospective buyers in Asia of LNG from East Africa have been eyeing alternative suppliers given the more than 4-year delay. Qatar, the United States, and Australia stand to benefit from any prolonged Mozambique instability.
“It’s not that Rwanda could withdraw — Rwanda will withdraw its troops if sustainable funding is not secured.”
— Olivier Nduhungirehe, Rwanda Foreign Minister
What to Watch
The EU’s decision on funding renewal by the May deadline will determine whether Rwanda’s 4,000 troops remain deployed. The Council adopted in November 2024 a €20 million top-up to support the Rwanda Defence Force deployment, but this covered only equipment and logistics, not the full operational costs.
Three scenarios loom. First, the EU extends funding, buying time but not solving the structural deficit between mission costs and donor commitments. Second, Rwanda withdraws gradually, handing responsibility to undertrained Mozambican forces and creating openings for insurgent resurgence. Third, TotalEnergies and other operators directly fund security — a precedent with troubling implications for sovereignty and accountability.
Mozambique’s government faces its own constraints. Mozambique LNG alone will contribute $35 billion to state revenues over 25 years, but those revenues depend on uninterrupted production. Any security breakdown forces a choice: absorb Rwanda’s operational costs directly, undermining fiscal stability, or risk losing the energy investment that promised to transform the economy.
Broader regional instability could follow. With the escalating conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo characterized by widespread violence, SADC has deemed it imperative to redirect military resources toward addressing this more severe crisis. SADC deployed in December 2024 a military mission to DRC. Limited SADC capacity means trade-offs: stabilize Mozambique or contain DRC spillover, but not both simultaneously.
The Cabo Delgado crisis crystallizes a larger question: whether African-led security operations can transition from donor dependency to sustainable domestic and regional financing. The African Union has urged private sector players, banks and international partners to increase financing for the AU Peace Fund, per Capital FM. The appeal was made during a session of the African Union Peace and Security Council, which engaged Donald Kaberuka on expanding the use of the African Union Peace Fund and securing sustainable funding for African-led peace missions. Whether rhetoric translates to resources will determine not just Mozambique’s trajectory, but the viability of the continent’s security architecture.