Sudan’s Civil War Becomes East Africa’s Infrastructure Threat
As Ethiopia, Egypt, and Chad shift from observers to combatants, the conflict now threatens Red Sea shipping lanes, submarine cables carrying 18% of global data, and agricultural supply chains already stressed by Iran tensions.
Ethiopia is now running a covert training base for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, hosting over 4,000 fighters in Benishangul-Gumuz region as satellite imagery confirms UAE-linked cargo planes delivering weapons since February 2026.
The disclosure, published by Middle East Eye on 10 April, marks Ethiopia’s transition from passive neighbour to active participant in Sudan’s 25-month civil war. Yale Humanitarian Research Lab satellite analysis shows IL-76 cargo aircraft, MI-17 helicopters, and C-130 transports operating from Asosa base between December 2025 and March 2026. Flight tracking data suggests Ethiopian Airlines may be directly trafficking weapons to RSF rear positions.
What began as an internal power struggle between Sudan’s army and the RSF paramilitary has metastasised into a multi-nation proxy contest threatening critical global Infrastructure. The regionalisation creates direct risks to 17 submarine cables passing through the Red Sea — conduits carrying the vast majority of data traffic between Europe, Asia, and Africa — while generating cascading shocks through agricultural commodity markets and refugee flows that now exceed 13.6 million displaced persons.
13.6 million
150,000+
33.7 million
-40%
Regional Powers Choose Sides
Chad shut its eastern border with Sudan indefinitely on 23 February, citing repeated armed incursions and deteriorating security. Egypt has intensified support for Sudan’s army while Ethiopia backs the RSF, creating a proxy battlefield overlay on the two nations’ unresolved dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The GERD conflict — centred on Nile water rights — gives both countries strategic incentives to weaken the other through Sudanese proxies.
The UAE provides financial and logistical support to the RSF despite international arms embargoes, per Council on Foreign Relations tracking. Saudi Arabia, traditionally aligned with Abu Dhabi on regional security, has shown growing discomfort with the UAE’s RSF support, creating Gulf Cooperation Council tension. Russia maintains ties to both factions while securing gold mining concessions and Red Sea naval access.
“The RSF is dependent on Ethiopia and the UAE and will do anything it can for Ethiopia if it goes to war,” Yohannes Gebreluel, a researcher at the London School of Economics, told The New Humanitarian. That prospect became more concrete in March when Tigray forces in northern Ethiopia signalled willingness to resume hostilities, raising the spectre of a merged Ethiopia-Sudan conflict zone stretching from the Red Sea to the Blue Nile.
Infrastructure Choke Points
Port Sudan hosts landing points for five international submarine cables, per Developing Telecoms: 2 Africa, EASSy, Falcon, SAS-1, and SAS-2. The broader Red Sea corridor carries 17 cables linking three continents. Simultaneous closure of Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz cable routes — now a credible scenario given Iran conflict escalation — would create unprecedented global disruption.
“Closing both choke points simultaneously would be a globally disruptive event. I’m not aware of that ever happening.”
— Doug Madory, Director of Internet Analysis at Kentik
Shipping diversions are already measurable. Red Sea traffic rerouted via Cape of Good Hope adds 3,500 nautical miles and 10-14 days to Asia-Europe routes, per Marine Insight carrier data. Egypt’s Suez Canal revenues dropped 40% from 2023 levels as Iran tensions forced sustained Cape routing through March 2026. Brent crude surged 42.3% since pre-conflict levels while European natural gas jumped 57%, amplifying inflationary pressure in economies still managing 2024-2025 energy shocks.
The RSF has acquired drone capabilities that could threaten Port Sudan’s commercial shipping operations and military supply lines, raising the prospect of direct attacks on Red Sea infrastructure. The narrow Bab el-Mandeb strait — already contested by Houthi forces in Yemen — creates a second vulnerability point where Sudan spillover and Iran conflict converge.
Agricultural Supply Collapse
Sudan’s groundnut exports collapsed from $295 million in the first half of 2022 to $1.6 million in H1 2025, according to Central Bank of Sudan data. Cotton exports fell from $301 million to $33.2 million over the same period. The country imports over 80% of wheat consumed domestically, with 2024 harvest production running 46% below average.
The convergence of Sudan’s agricultural collapse with Iran conflict disruption creates compounding food security risks. The World Food Programme warns 45 million additional people could face acute food insecurity if Iran war continues, with Sudan’s import dependence making it especially vulnerable to Strait of Hormuz closure or Red Sea shipping disruption.
Traditional smuggling routes through Libya and the Red Sea are under pressure from Iran conflict escalation, creating incentives for new trafficking corridors through Ethiopia and the Blue Nile basin. These routes would pass directly through RSF-controlled territory, potentially generating revenue streams that prolong the conflict.
East Darfur’s El Daein Teaching Hospital was attacked in early April, leaving at least 64 dead and rendering the facility non-functional. The hospital served over 2 million people, per World Health Organization assessments. Across Sudan, 21.2 million people face acute food insecurity while 4 million children suffer acute malnutrition.
Displacement Cascades
Of 13.6 million displaced, 9.3 million remain inside Sudan while 4.3 million have crossed into neighbouring countries, per UN refugee data from January. Chad hosts the largest refugee population despite closing its border, while Egypt, South Sudan, and Ethiopia absorb smaller but growing numbers. Kenya and Uganda face secondary displacement as Refugees move beyond immediate border areas seeking economic opportunity.
The refugee flows create fiscal pressure on host governments already managing domestic economic stress. Chad’s border closure reflects this calculation — accepting refugees generates international aid flows but also security costs and social tension. Egypt’s tolerance for Sudanese arrivals is conditioned on maintaining leverage over army faction leadership.
- 17 submarine cables through Red Sea carrying majority of Europe-Asia-Africa data traffic
- Port Sudan hosts 5 international cable landing points (2 Africa, EASSy, Falcon, SAS-1, SAS-2)
- Suez Canal traffic down 40% with sustained Cape of Good Hope rerouting adding 10-14 days transit
- Strait of Hormuz-Red Sea simultaneous closure would create unprecedented global internet disruption
- Bab el-Mandeb strait vulnerable to RSF drone capabilities and Houthi operations
External Power Competition
The September 2025 Quad framework declaration stated that “external military support is essential to ending the conflict,” but subsequent months brought intensified outside intervention rather than coordinated de-escalation. UAE and Saudi Arabia, traditional security partners, now back opposing factions. Russia plays both sides while securing economic concessions. Egypt and Ethiopia treat Sudan as terrain for settling their Nile water dispute.
“We are running out of time,” Carl Skau, World Food Programme Deputy Executive Director, said in recent remarks. The warning reflects not just humanitarian urgency but recognition that prolonged conflict creates windows for opportunistic escalation by regional actors with unrelated grievances.
The conflict’s expansion into a multi-nation contest makes negotiated settlement structurally harder. Each external backer has invested in their chosen faction’s success, creating sunk cost dynamics that discourage compromise. Ethiopia’s RSF training base represents institutional commitment beyond arms shipments — infrastructure designed for sustained conflict support.
What to Watch
Ethiopia-Tigray conflict resumption would merge two war zones into a single regional system, with RSF forces potentially engaging Ethiopian federal government opponents. Such escalation would threaten the entire Blue Nile basin and force Kenya, Uganda, and other East African states into crisis management mode.
Track Gulf Cooperation Council dynamics between UAE and Saudi Arabia. Any public Saudi criticism of UAE’s RSF support would signal GCC fracture with broader Middle East implications. Conversely, Saudi acquiescence indicates acceptance of prolonged Sudan conflict as manageable cost.
Monitor submarine cable network resilience as Iran conflict continues. Tech companies are developing contingency routing plans, but simultaneous Red Sea-Hormuz closure would exceed existing backup capacity. African data center operators in Kenya, South Africa, and Egypt would face direct exposure.
Agricultural commodity prices provide early warning indicators for food security cascade. Sudan’s wheat import dependence makes it vulnerable to any Strait of Hormuz shipping disruption, while collapsed domestic production removes buffer capacity. Global wheat futures markets will price Sudan scenario risk as refugee numbers grow.
Chad’s border closure sustainability is testable. If fighting intensifies in Darfur, refugee pressure on Chad’s eastern frontier will exceed security forces’ containment capacity, forcing either military escalation or border reopening with humanitarian consequences.