US Designates Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood as Terror Group, Escalating Iran Proxy War in Horn of Africa
Washington's move targets an organization that governed Sudan for three decades and claims 20,000 fighters, setting legal precedent for sanctioning political Islamist movements with governance history.
The United States designated Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on Monday, marking the first time Washington has applied terrorism statutes to an Islamist movement that governed a country for 30 years and maintained formal state institutions. The designation, which takes effect March 16, positions the US against Iran’s regional network in the Horn of Africa while creating legal and operational complications for Sudan’s reconstruction and humanitarian access.
According to the State Department, the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood has contributed 20,000 fighters to Sudan’s civil war, many receiving training from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Secretary of State Marco Rubio accused the group of conducting mass executions of civilians and using violence to advance “its violent Islamist ideology.” The designation blocks all US-based assets and prohibits American persons from conducting transactions with the organization or its armed wing, the al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, which was sanctioned separately in September 2025.
The designation expands beyond traditional counterterrorism targets. The Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood governed Sudan from 1989 to 2019 under Omar al-Bashir’s regime, operating ministries, collecting taxes, and maintaining diplomatic relations recognized by the United States and United Nations. The organization now backs the Sudanese Armed Forces in a civil war against the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary, which has displaced 13.6 million people and created what the World Health Organization calls “the worst Humanitarian Crisis globally.”
Gulf Rivalry Shapes Regional Strategy
The move aligns Washington with Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Sudan’s proxy war, but exposes tensions in that coalition. Al Jazeera reports the UAE welcomed the designation, with its Foreign Ministry stating it reflects “sustained efforts” to halt Muslim Brotherhood activities. Yet the UAE simultaneously backs the RSF, which fights against SAF forces that include Muslim Brotherhood fighters – creating a paradox where Abu Dhabi opposes the ideology while arming its battlefield opponent.
Saudi Arabia, by contrast, openly supports the SAF and views the Muslim Brotherhood’s role as preferable to state collapse. According to Middle East Eye, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman lobbied President Trump in November 2025 to pressure the UAE over its RSF support, with sources indicating Riyadh requested not only RSF designation as a terror group but secondary sanctions on the UAE itself. Pakistan is reportedly facilitating a $1.5 billion arms deal to Sudan’s military, with Al Jazeera noting Saudi involvement in funding the transaction.
The Quad for Sudan – comprising the US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt – agreed in September 2025 that “Sudan’s future cannot be dictated by violent extremist groups part of or evidently linked to the Muslim brotherhood,” according to a State Department joint statement. But that consensus masks divergent interests: Saudi Arabia prioritizes Red Sea stability and fears state collapse on its border, while the UAE views Muslim Brotherhood influence as an existential ideological threat regardless of which faction controls territory.
Iran Network Expansion
The designation explicitly links the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood to Iran’s regional apparatus. According to State Department documents, IRGC support includes training, drone provision, and operational coordination with Muslim Brotherhood militias. Videos released after US-Israeli strikes on Iran in 2025 showed Sudanese Islamist commanders pledging to send fighters to defend Tehran, with one leader stating his forces possessed “advanced generations of drones” ready for deployment.
This represents a sectarian anomaly: Sunni Muslim Brotherhood forces receiving material support from Shiite Iran. Analysts attribute the relationship to strategic pragmatism rather than theological alignment. During the 1990s, Sudan under Hassan al-Turabi hosted Hamas offices, provided logistical corridors for Iranian weapons shipments, and welcomed Osama bin Laden. That infrastructure was dismantled after Bashir’s 2019 ouster, but the Jerusalem Post notes the current war has enabled Muslim Brotherhood networks to reactivate regional financing channels and recruit former intelligence officers from the Bashir era.
The designation marks the first time the US has labeled a Muslim Brotherhood chapter that governed through formal state institutions. Previous designations targeted Hamas (1997) and other armed offshoots, but the Sudanese branch operated ministries, embassies, and central bank functions from 1989-2019. This creates ambiguity about whether former government officials face sanctions for past administrative roles versus current militia activity.
Iran’s involvement extends beyond ideology. Reuters previously reported that Ethiopia hosts a UAE-financed RSF training camp, while Iranian drones have been documented assisting SAF operations. The configuration creates a three-way proxy competition: Iran and Muslim Brotherhood militias support SAF, the UAE backs RSF through Chad and Libya supply routes, and Saudi Arabia provides diplomatic cover and financing to SAF while opposing Islamist influence within its ranks.
Humanitarian Access Complications
The designation carries immediate operational consequences for aid delivery. Under US counterterrorism law, any transaction with a Foreign Terrorist Organization constitutes material support, exposing NGOs to criminal liability if they coordinate with Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated actors for convoy access, distribution permissions, or local security arrangements. With 33.7 million people requiring assistance and 37% of health facilities non-functional, according to WHO data, aid groups operate in areas controlled by multiple armed factions.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s governance legacy complicates compliance. Unlike purely armed groups, the SMB maintains institutional presence in education, health services, and local administration in SAF-controlled areas. Humanitarian organizations must now verify that Sudanese counterparts – including hospital administrators, local council members, and civil society partners – have no affiliation with an organization that governed for three decades and embedded itself across state structures.
- Sets template for targeting Islamist movements with governance history, not just armed wings
- Creates legal risk for political settlements involving MB-affiliated actors in transition governments
- Extends Iran sanctions architecture to political movements beyond Hezbollah and Houthi armed groups
- Tests boundaries between ideology-based designation and violence-based Terrorism criteria
The designation compounds an already dire situation. UN News reports more than 20 million people require health assistance while 21 million face acute food insecurity. WHO has verified 201 attacks on healthcare facilities since April 2023, resulting in 1,858 deaths. Cholera has been reported in all 18 states, with simultaneous outbreaks of dengue, malaria, and measles overwhelming the fractured health system.
Reconstruction Timeline Impact
The designation extends legal risk beyond the battlefield to Sudan’s post-conflict reconstruction. Any political settlement that includes Muslim Brotherhood representation in a transitional government could trigger sanctions exposure for international financial institutions, bilateral donors, and private investors. This creates what analysts call a “peace penalty” – where negotiated outcomes involving all parties become legally toxic for external engagement.
Sudan’s brief removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in December 2020 unlocked access to international lending institutions and debt relief mechanisms. Research published in PMC found that delisting was a key variable attracting foreign direct investment in agriculture, minerals, and oil sectors. The Muslim Brotherhood designation does not reimpose state sponsor status, but creates entity-level restrictions that function similarly for any business or government dealing with Sudanese counterparts who may have Brotherhood ties.
The economic stakes are substantial. Saudi Arabia announced plans for $50 billion in reconstruction investment in October 2025, according to analysis by Steptoe, targeting Sudan’s agricultural land and Red Sea port access. The UAE had invested $7.6 billion before Bashir’s fall and maintains interests in Red Sea infrastructure. Both face due diligence requirements to ensure investments do not benefit designated entities – a nearly impossible standard given the Muslim Brotherhood’s institutional penetration during three decades of governance.
What to Watch
The Federal Register publication on March 16 will clarify whether the designation extends to affiliate organizations, former government officials from the Bashir era, or entities that received state resources when the SMB controlled ministries. Treasury guidance on humanitarian carve-outs will determine whether aid agencies can operate in SAF-controlled territories without sanctions exposure. The Quad’s promised peace plan, expected this month according to US Africa envoy Massad Boulos, must navigate whether any transitional formula can include Brotherhood-affiliated figures without triggering designation consequences. Regional indicators include whether Egypt moves to arrest Muslim Brotherhood commanders transiting its territory, whether Saudi Arabia continues arming SAF despite ideological misgivings, and whether the UAE leverages the designation to justify continued RSF support as a counterweight to Islamist expansion. Sudan’s reconstruction timeline now depends not on military outcomes but on legal determinations about who governed the past and who can participate in governing the future.