The Shipyard Paradox: How Trump’s Maritime Plan Sidesteps the Industrial Collapse It Promised to Fix
Administration's blueprint emphasizes regulation and allied investment over recommendations to rebuild domestic capacity—leaving the U.S. with 232 times less shipbuilding tonnage than China.
The United States produces fewer than 10 large commercial vessels annually—down from more than 1,000 ships per year during World War II—yet the Trump administration’s long-awaited Maritime Action Plan conspicuously omits several key recommendations from its own advisors on how to reverse the collapse.
Released February 13, the 42-page strategy emphasizes regulatory streamlining, allied partnerships, and workforce training, but largely sidesteps proposals to directly expand domestic shipyard infrastructure or mandate sustained government procurement—the very mechanisms that built American naval dominance in the 20th century. The gap between aspiration and appropriation is stark: according to Washington Monthly, the Small Shipyard Grant Program received just $8.75 million in Trump’s most recent appropriations bill, less than half the $21 million allocated during the Biden administration and a record low despite demand exceeding supply by more than five times.
The Numeric Abyss
A leaked Office of Naval Intelligence slide confirms Alliance for American Manufacturing analysis: China’s shipyards possess 23.25 million tons of Manufacturing capacity versus fewer than 100,000 tons in the United States—a 232-to-1 advantage. In 2024, China built over 1,000 commercial vessels; the U.S. built eight. Of 5,448 large commercial vessels on order worldwide in 2024, American shipyards are constructing three, according to Progressive Policy Institute data.
The Pentagon’s own 45-day shipbuilding review, completed in April 2024, determined that the industrial base will require 174,000 new workers over the next decade to meet Navy goals, per Government Accountability Office findings. Current employment stands at 145,700—down 36% from the 198,700 employed in June 1980. South Korea, by contrast, delivered 230 commercial vessels in 2024, capturing 21% of global output, while Japan accounted for 13% with 668 vessels on order.
| Country | Vessels Built | Global Market Share |
|---|---|---|
| China | 1,000+ | 53.3% |
| South Korea | 230 | 21% |
| Japan | — | 13% |
| United States | 8 | 0.2% |
What the Plan Proposes—and What It Doesn’t
The Maritime Action Plan, mandated by Trump’s April 2025 executive order, calls for establishing Maritime Prosperity Zones modeled on Opportunity Zones, modernizing the Merchant Marine Academy, and introducing port fees on foreign-built vessels. It directs the Department of Defense to assess Defense Production Act authorities for shipyard investment and proposes a Maritime Security Trust Fund requiring congressional authorization.
Conspicuously absent: binding multiyear procurement contracts that would provide predictable demand signals to shipyards. The Navy’s fiscal year 2025 shipbuilding plan projects a fleet of 390 battle force ships by 2054 at an average annual cost of $40 billion, according to Congressional Budget Office estimates—31% to 40% above the five-year average. Yet none of the seven major shipbuilders are currently positioned to meet Navy delivery goals due to infrastructure and workforce constraints, GAO reported in January 2025.
The U.S. possesses eight active shipyards capable of building vessels over 400 feet in length, plus 22 with drydocking capability and 25 with topside repair capacity. China operates 13 major shipyards, with a single facility at Jiangnan possessing more drydock square footage than the entire U.S. public shipyard system combined.
The administration’s approach relies heavily on foreign partnerships. A July 2025 bilateral deal with South Korea announced $150 billion in maritime investment, but Trump undercut momentum by staging an immigration raid at a Georgia battery plant operated by South Korean firms, according to Washington Monthly. Hanwha Ocean, which acquired Philadelphia Shipyard for $100 million in 2024, committed $5 billion to expand capacity from 1.5 vessels annually to 20 by the late 2020s—but the joint-build model relies on construction in South Korea for components U.S. yards cannot produce.
In October 2025, Trump signed a memorandum with Finland for a “block buy” of Coast Guard icebreakers, with the first four to be built in Finnish yards. Former Navy officials warn this outsourcing forfeits the very leverage—access to U.S. government contracts—needed to attract foreign investment in American facilities, per analysis in Defense One.
The Indo-Pacific Implications
China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy operates 370 ships and submarines—the world’s largest fleet—and is projected to reach 435 vessels by 2030, compared to the U.S. Navy’s current 293 battle force ships. The disparity extends beyond hulls: China’s military-civil fusion strategy allows state-owned shipyards to redirect commercial revenue toward warship construction. China State Shipbuilding Corporation built more commercial tonnage in 2024 than the entire U.S. shipbuilding industry has produced since World War II, Eurasian Times reported.
The strategic calculus is unforgiving. CSIS wargames on a Taiwan conflict scenario project significant U.S. naval losses—and China’s capacity to repair damaged vessels or construct replacements dwarfs American surge potential. National security advisor Jake Sullivan acknowledged at the Aspen Security Forum in December 2024 that rebuilding the shipbuilding base is a “generational project,” noting the industry’s “bottom fell out” in the early 1980s.
- DOD has spent $5.8 billion on shipbuilding industrial base support since 2014, with $12.6 billion planned through 2028—yet GAO found no performance metrics to assess effectiveness.
- Virginia-class submarine deliveries averaged 1.1 boats annually since 2022, below the two-per-year target, with the Columbia-class delayed until at least 2028.
- The $21 billion Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program had disbursed only $2 billion as of early 2025, constraining modernization of aging public yards averaging 76 years old.
- All seven major shipbuilders face workforce shortages, with attrition rates exceeding 20% among younger workers and skilled tradespeople averaging 55 years old.
What to Watch
The administration’s legislative package, expected with the fiscal year 2027 budget request in March 2026, will reveal whether symbolic ambition translates to appropriations. The SHIPS for America Act, reintroduced with bipartisan support, proposes multiyear procurement and a permanent Office of Maritime Security Advisor—measures the executive order deferred to Congress.
South Korea’s $150 billion commitment remains nonbinding, and shipyard executives note that training timelines extend years: Hanwha Philly plans to rotate U.S. workers to South Korean facilities to address instructor shortages. Meanwhile, China’s shipyards are expanding capacity by 80% through 2028 as mothballed yards recommission, according to shipbroker BRS analysis.
The fundamental question persists: whether the United States can rebuild an industrial ecosystem that sustains itself without federal scaffolding—or whether the plan’s reliance on allied expertise and deregulation amounts to outsourcing the problem it was designed to solve. The Office of Naval Intelligence projects China will field 475 warships by 2035. U.S. projections assume, per GAO testimony, that “the industrial base will perform better on cost and schedule than it has historically”—an assumption two decades of overruns have yet to validate.