EU Pressures Ukraine to Repair Druzhba Pipeline as Hungary Blocks €90 Billion Loan

The European Commission is urging Ukraine to accelerate repairs to the Druzhba oil pipeline after Bloomberg reported a Russian attack on January 27 damaged the pumping station near Brody, halting Russian crude shipments to Hungary and Slovakia and triggering a diplomatic crisis that has paralyzed a €90 billion EU loan to Ukraine.

The outage has placed Ukraine in a strategic bind. Allowing Russian oil to flow generates revenue for the Kremlin—potentially up to $6.5 billion annually according to International Centre for Defence and Security—while prolonging repairs strains relations with two EU member states that have now blocked critical financial support for Kyiv. Euronews confirmed Hungary has vetoed both the €90 billion loan and the EU’s 20th Sanctions package against Russia, while Slovakia joined the blockade on February 23.

The Damage Assessment Dispute

Ukraine maintains that Ukrainska Pravda reported Russian strikes on January 27 damaged high-pressure pumps and control systems at the Brody hub, making transit physically impossible. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha posted photos of burning infrastructure and declared force majeure. But Hungary and Slovakia reject this account entirely.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán claimed on March 2 that satellite imagery proves the pipeline is operational, according to Hungarian Conservative. Slovak intelligence services reportedly reached the same conclusion. Orbán accused Ukraine of “ordinary blackmail” and deployed Hungarian troops near the border to establish a no-drone zone, framing the dispute as a national security crisis ahead of Hungary’s April 12 election—where he trails opposition leader Péter Magyar in polls.

The European Commission has proposed sending an inspection mission to assess the damage. Euronews reported that Hungary and Slovakia established a joint investigative committee on February 27, demanding access to the pipeline. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy invited Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico to Ukraine for talks but warned that repairs are dangerous: “So that we lose people? I think that is a very high price,” he said during EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s February 25 visit to Kyiv.

Ukraine’s Revenue Stream—and Export Problem

The outage has created an unexpected complication: Ukraine was using Druzhba to export its own oil. Reuters reported on February 27 that Ukraine injected approximately 40,000 metric tons of crude monthly into the pipeline at Brody for delivery to Hungary and Slovakia—previously unreported volumes processed at Hungarian refiner MOL’s facilities alongside much larger Russian shipments.

The halt denies Ukraine export revenue needed to contain its budget deficit. If sustained, industry sources told Reuters, it could force Kyiv to shut down domestic oil production entirely. Ukraine’s last refining capacity was destroyed in mid-2025, leaving the Druzhba route as the only export option after the completion of the Odesa-Brody pipeline in 2002, which has seen minimal use.

Ukraine proposed using the Odesa-Brody pipeline as an alternative—routing seaborne oil through Black Sea terminals and onward to the EU—but Hungary and Slovakia have shown no interest. They want Russian crude, which Orbán claims is 13-20% cheaper than alternatives.

The Croatian Alternative

The European Commission confirmed on February 26 that there is “no immediate risk” to EU Energy security. Both Hungary and Slovakia have released strategic reserves and begun receiving non-Russian crude via Croatia’s Adria pipeline, which operator JANAF says can deliver 280,000 barrels per day—enough to replace the 200,000 bpd previously coming from Russia.

But Budapest has resisted this option for years. Hungary argues Adria lacks capacity and that Croatian transit fees are commercially unviable. In October 2025, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó accused Croatia of “trying to profit from the war in Ukraine.” Croatian Economy Minister Ante Šušnjar called the allegations “100% not true.”

Hungary initially requested that Croatia allow Russian oil imports via Adria, invoking its sanctions exemption for seaborne deliveries if pipeline flows are disrupted. Croatia is analyzing whether this complies with EU and U.S. sanctions but has not committed. So far, only non-Russian crude has flowed through Adria.

Retaliatory Measures Escalate

Hungary and Slovakia have deployed economic countermeasures. Both countries halted diesel exports to Ukraine on February 18. Slovakia cut emergency electricity supplies—though the impact has been limited, as Poland and Romania stepped in. Ukraine relied on Slovakia and Hungary for 68% of electricity imports before the cutoff, Wikipedia noted.

Ukraine escalated in turn. On the night of February 22-23, Ukrainian drones struck the Kaleykino oil pumping station in Russia’s Tatarstan region—1,200 kilometers from the border—engulfing two 50,000-cubic-meter storage tanks in flames. The facility is a critical hub for mixing crude from Western Siberia and the Volga region before export via Druzhba. Ukrainian officials framed the strike as part of a campaign to reduce Russian oil revenues, but it intensified tensions with Hungary and Slovakia.

The dispute has exposed Brussels’ competing obligations. The Commission must safeguard energy security for all member states—including Hungary and Slovakia—while delivering the €90 billion loan agreed in December. EU High Representative Kaja Kallas called the Hungarian and Slovak vetoes a “setback” that undermines the “principle of sincere cooperation” in EU treaties.

What to Watch

The EU inspection mission—if Ukraine grants access—will determine whether the pipeline can resume operations. If damage is confirmed, repairs could take weeks or months while Russian attacks continue. If the pipeline is functional, Ukraine faces accusations of weaponizing energy transit.

Hungary’s April 12 election adds urgency. Orbán is using the dispute to frame opposition leader Péter Magyar as aligned with Brussels and Kyiv against Hungarian interests. A prolonged outage benefits his campaign narrative but deepens Hungary’s isolation within the EU.

For Russia, the disruption cuts both ways. Moscow loses $6.5 billion in annual oil export revenue but avoids paying Ukraine transit fees. The Kaleykino strike demonstrates Ukraine’s capacity to target infrastructure deep inside Russian territory—raising questions about Druzhba’s long-term viability even if repairs succeed.

The precedent matters beyond oil. If Hungary’s veto succeeds in extracting concessions, it establishes a template for leveraging energy dependence against EU unity. If it fails, Budapest and Bratislava face pressure to finally diversify away from Russian crude—a shift both governments have resisted for over two years of full-scale war.